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Objectives of the Annual Assessment of Major 
Weapon System Programs
• Provide a cost/schedule snapshot of DOD’s 2008 portfolio of 
major weapon system programs and a comparison to portfolios at 
two other points in time – 1 year ago and 5 years ago
• Provide observations about the portfolio’s balance, performance 
of newer programs, and ability to deliver to the warfighter on time
• Analyze outcomes and knowledge attained at key junctures in 
the acquisition process for a subset of the 47 programs primarily 
still in development
• Gather data on other factors that might impact program stability 
and outcomes such as: cost estimating, requirement setting, 
software management, and program office staffing
• Provide an update on DOD acquisition policy changes
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Snapshot: Committed and Planned Spending on 

























































Billions of FY 2009 dollars
Commitments outstanding-$786 Billion 
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Snapshot: Overall Cost and Schedule Growth for the 
Current Portfolio of 96 Programs
Portfolio status   Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008
Number of programs 77 95 96
Total planned commitments $1.2 trillion $1.6 trillion $1.6 trillion
Commitments outstanding $724 billion $875 billion $786 billion
Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate 37 percent 40 percent 42 percent
Change in total acquisition cost from first estimate 19 percent 26 percent 25 percent
Estimated total acquisition cost growth $183 billion $301 billion $296 billion
Share of programs with 25 percent or more increase 
in program acquisition unit cost 41 percent 44 percent 42 percent
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities 18 months 21 months 22 months
 
Performance of DOD’s Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
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Observation: Top 10 Programs Continue to Strain 
DOD’s Buying Power Elsewhere
• 10 of the department’s largest programs, commanding 
about 50% of the acquisition dollars in the portfolio, 
have experienced significant cost growth and quantity 
reductions:
• Development costs have grown by 32%
• Total program costs have grown by 12%
• Overall quantities have been reduced by 32%
• 7 have acquisition unit costs of greater than 40%
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Observation: Top 10 Programs Continue to Strain 
DOD’s Buying Power Elsewhere
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
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Observation: Promised Capabilities Continue to Be 
Delivered Later Than Planned
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Schedule Delays for DOD’s 2008 Program Portfolio
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Age of Program 
















15 or more years since 
development start 47 percent 19 percent -39 percent 37 months 10
10 to 14 years since 
development start 73 percent 53 percent 52 percent 26 months 17
5 to 9 years since 
development start 37 percent 31 percent 9 percent 22 months 25
Less than 5 years 
since development start 12 percent 11 percent 1 percent 5 months 28
Observation: New Programs Are Performing Better 
Than Older Programs at This Time
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Changes in Program Cost and Schedule by Age of Program
Fiscal Year 2008 Portfolio
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Caveat: Historically, Largest Percentage of RDT&E 
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Percentage of product development phase completed






Tot l e 28.3
Note: Does not add due to rounding.
Source: GAO-06-391
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Knowledge Analysis: Newer Programs Are Starting 
with Higher Technology Readiness Levels
• Since 2003, there has been a 
significant increase in the 
percentage of critical 
technologies at least nearing 
maturity (demonstrated in a 
relevant environment) prior to 
development start.
• In the last 3 years, all 5 
programs entering system 
development had their critical 
technologies demonstrated in 
at least a relevant environment, 
in accordance with the DOD 
and statutory criteria.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Note: Number of programs and technologies in parentheses.
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Knowledge Analysis: Programs Report More Design 
Drawings Complete at CDR
• Since 2003, the average 
percentage of design drawings 
releasable for programs at the 
critical design has steadily 
increased.
• However, designs, on average, 
are still far from stable and 
concurrent technology 
development increases risk of 
subsequent design changes 
and rework.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. Note: Number of programs in parentheses.
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Knowledge Analysis: Programs Conducting Early 
Systems Engineering Have Better Outcomes to Date
• Early systems engineering, 
ideally before a program enters 
development, is critical to 
ensuring that requirements can 
be met with available 
resources.
• Programs that conducted key 
systems engineering events 
prior to development start have 
experienced lower cost growth 
on average and often have 
shorter delays in achieving 
initial operational capability.
Average RDT&E Cost Growth by Timing of Key 
Systems Engineering Reviews
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
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Data on Other Factors: Requirements, Software Mgmt, 
Cost Estimating, Staffing
• Programs that changed key system requirements after 
starting development had cost increases 3x greater than 
others and schedule delays 2x greater
• Programs with software growth of 25% or more have 
experienced much more cost and schedule growth then 
those with lower levels
• Most programs initial cost baselines are based on the 
program’s or service’s own estimate and assumptions rather 
than on an independent estimate done by, for example, the 
CAIG
• Most programs are not now able to fill all government 
positions (PM, SE, K, Admin) they have been authorized
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Areas of Relative Agreement Between the DOD and 
GAO Concerning Problem Sources
• Acquisition problems have their roots in the 
requirements and funding processes
• Programs are initiated with poor foundations and 
inadequate knowledge for developing realistic cost 
estimates
• Programs move forward with artificially low cost 
estimates, optimistic schedules and assumptions, 
immature technologies and designs, and fluid 
requirements
• Imbalance between needs and the resources available to 
meet them contributes to budget and program instability
• Changing or excessive requirements cause cost growth
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Recent DOD Acquisition Policy Changes Have the 
Potential to Significantly Improve Outcomes
More discipline in the early phases and throughout process will put more 
knowledge (less risk) upfront in the process
• Materiel Development Decision required for all programs to level requirements and 
resources before starting the program
• Configuration Steering Boards established to control requirements creep
• Preference for incremental development, with baselines for each increment
• Preference for holding PDR before system development start
• Competitive prototyping required prior to Milestone B as part of technology 
development phase
• Growth of Capability Portfolio Managers to elevate programs from stovepipes 
(reduce gaps/redundant programs)
Areas of continuing concern
• Still does not require “time certain” development 
• Still allows for concurrent technology and product development and production
• Post-CDR assessment still not a milestone decision
• Controls not in place to ensure accountability and adherence to intent of new policy
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Concluding Remarks
• Acquisition policy initiatives are aimed at the proper target --
the front-end of the process and the systems engineering that 
is required there
• There is growing consensus that the root causes of poor 
outcomes lie in misunderstood requirements, unreliable 
estimates, and unmanageable development times
• The Congress’ reform legislation also targets the appropriate 
troublemakers – lack of systems engineering expertise, lack 
of accountability and independence among key players
• What’s doable on paper is not always doable in reality – the 
people involved in this enterprise, all of them, must be willing












RDT&E and Procurement Funding 2009-2013
(FY09 Dollars)
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Observation: Top 10 Programs Continue to Strain 
DOD’s Buying Power Elsewhere
5/14/2009 19
Knowledge-Based Acquisition Model Focuses 








Technologies, time, funding and
other resources match customer needs.









• Model provides framework for incremental, time certain (development constrained to 5 to 6 years 
or less), and knowledge-based approach to weapon system acquisitions.
• Success requires structured, disciplined application and adherence to model.
• Knowledge points align with key investment inflection points.
• Controls are in place for decisions makers to measure progress against specific criteria and 
ensure managers capture key knowledge before moving to next phase.
Knowledge Point 2
Design is stable and performs 
as expected.
Decision to start building and testing 
production representative prototypes. 
Knowledge Point 3
Production meets cost, schedule, 
and quality targets.
Decision to produce first units for 
customer.
5 to 6 years or less
Source: GAO.
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Other Factors: Programs that Changed Key 
Requirements Experienced Added Instability
• For programs that had at least one requirements change, the 
average RDT&E cost was more than three times higher and the 
average schedule delay was twice as long as programs without 
these changes. 
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
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Big Picture: DOD Investment Remains 
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Fiscal year 2009
dollars in billions
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement Funding
Source: GAO analysis of National Defense Budget Estimates for  the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget.
